"A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest".

- Michel Foucault “Practicing criticism, or, is it really important to think?”, interview by Didier Eribon, May 30-31, 1981, in Politics, Philosophy, Culture, ed. L. Kriztman (1988), p. 155

Saturday, August 27, 2011

Can Critical Rationalism be adopted as a Scientific Method? - Faizal N.M.


Abstract
Critical rationalism is an approach to knowledge that considers the nature of problems and their solutions. As the majority of philosophical traditions consider knowledge as something certain, critical rationalist takes the view that knowledge is nevertheless possible. They always maintain a critical attitude to all knowledge claims that they encounter and for them truth is an endless quest. The modern founder of critical rationalism is K.R.Popper. Among the twentieth century philosophers, Popper was one of the most influential philosopher of science, a self professed critical rationalist and an opponent of all forms of skepticism, conventionalism and relativism in science.
Science and its methods are highly regarded in modern times. Scientific method is greatly concerned with the nature of science because the nature of an object has got a lot to do with the method of inquiry. There are three complimentary features for the nature of science, the scientific method, the relation of science to physical nature, that is, to know the nature and to change it, and to know or to study the nature in the philosophical aspect of science and the effort to change it in the technological aspect of science. The primary aim of science is the attainment of systematic and reliable law so as to be able to make predictions and to effect changes. For the attainment of systematic and reliable knowledge, the scientific method has got an important part to play. So, here I have made an attempt to consider whether critical rationalistic approach of Popper can be adopted as a reliable scientific method.


Faizal N.M.
Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy
Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit
Email: faizalnm@yahoo.co.in


















Can Critical Rationalism be adopted as a Scientific Method?
Critical Rationalism is the name given to a strand of philosophy that considers the nature of problems and their solutions. It encourages a style of thinking that addresses real problems in a practical way, leading to real solutions. It actively promotes criticism of all conceptualizations currently maintained, that any remaining error in knowledge might be detected and eliminated as quickly as possible. The primary intellectual function according to critical rationalism is to maintain a critical attitude to all knowledge claims that are encountered. It exposes even greater realms of human knowledge and opinion, as well as one’s own experience to critical scrutiny, for there is simply no area that ought artificially to be exempted from confirming criticism. It is a kind of evolving philosophical tradition concerning how to approach knowledge. It is the Socratic method only with a little bit of modern awareness. Whilst most philosophical traditions regard knowledge as something that has to be certain and justified, critical rationalism, takes the view that there are no ultimate answers, but knowledge is nevertheless possible. Truth is an endless quest.


Critical Rationalist Tradition
The main task of human reason is to make the universe understandable, which is also the task of science. For this there are two essential components, of which the first is the poetic inventiveness, i.e., story telling or myth-making the invention of stories that explain the world. The invention of explanations and explanatory stories is one of the basic functions which human language has to serve. Another important component is of rationality which has arisen out of the establishment of writings in Greece, i.e., through the critical cosmologist, Anaximander, the pupil of Thalesi. It is the invention of criticism of the critical discussion of the various explanatory myths that is with the aim of consciously improving upon them. The Greek rationalismii, that is the Greek critical tradition produced at least for four or five generations, in each new generation, an ingenious revision of the teachings of the preceding generation took place. The conjectural character of human knowledge and the need to anticipate boldly can be found in the fragments of writings of Xenophanesiii, Heraclitusiv, and Democritusv and further adopted by Socrates. Finally, they established a scientific tradition; a tradition of criticism which survived for at least five hundred years and which also resisted some serious onslaughts before it succumbed. The critical tradition was founded by the adoption of the method of criticizing a received story or explanation and then proceeding to a new, improved, imaginative story which in turn is submitted to criticism. This is the method of science. In the Renaissance, it was not so much reinvented as reimported from the East, together with the rediscovery of Greek philosophy and Greek science. The cosmological or astronomical findings of Thales, Anaximander, Parmenides, Plato, Aristarchus and so on became the basis of all future science. Human science started from a bold and hopeful attempt to understand critically the world in which we live in. It was only since Newton, that humanity has become fully conscious of its position in the universe. All these are the results of the culture clash or the clash of frameworks, which led to the application of the method of critical discussion, an attempt to understand and to explain the world.
The critical tradition thus paved the way for the realization that the attempts to see and to find the truth are not final, but open to improvement. All knowledge and all doctrines are conjectural. It consists of guesses, of hypotheses, rather than of certain and final truths. Criticism and critical discussion are the means of getting nearer to the truth.vi Thus it leads to the tradition of bold conjectures and of free criticism, that is, the tradition which created the rational or scientific attitude, and with it the Western civilization, the only civilization which is based upon science. Such bold changes of doctrine are not forbidden in this rationalist tradition and thereby, innovation is encouraged and is regarded as success, as improvement, if it is based on the result of a critical discussion of its predecessors. The very boldness of an innovation is admired and can be controlled by the severity of its critical examination. Thus the changes of doctrine, far from being made surreptitiously are traditionally handed down together with the older doctrines and the names of the innovators and the material for a history of ideas become part of the school tradition.vii
The critical rationalists’ traditions are less concerned with the pre-occupying worries of traditional philosophy, that is, whether the knowledge is securely founded, or if it is how it is. For them, knowledge is not securely founded; being freely aired rather than steadily grounded; nothing on earth would be gained if it were. They give prominence only to the conjectures which are under debate are right and not to the reasons to suppose that they are. If a conjecture withers all the objections raised against it, then there is no reason to suppose that it is not right. Moreover, if there is no reason to suppose that it is right, then there is no reason to think that is wrong. Thus, according to them, arguments are always negative and are always critical which are only used and needed only to unseat conjectures that have been surmised earlier. Thereby, in the realm of errors, cure is more important than prevention forms the gist of philosophy of human knowledge labelled as critical rationalism.
Popper as a Critical Rationalist
The modern founder of critical rationalism is Karl Raimund Popper. Popper pointed out that nothing can be justified, but can only be merely criticized and weed out bad ideas and work with what’s left. He coined the term critical rationalism to describe his philosophy. This designation is significant which indicates the rejection of classical empiricism and of the observationalist- inductivist account of science that had grown out of it. Popper is widely viewed as one of the twentieth century’s greatest philosophers of science. He was also a social and political philosopher of considerable stature, a staunch defender of liberal democracy and the principles of social criticism upon which it is based, and implacable opponent of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. He is best known for his repudiation of the classical observationalist-inductivist account of science, his espousal of falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation between science and non-science, and his defense of the ‘open society’. Thus, Popper was a self-professed critical rationalist, a dedicated opponent of all forms of skepticism, conventionalism and relativism in science and in human affairs generally.
The emphasis upon the importance of philosophy for understanding and solving the practical problems of world has been a constant theme throughout Popper’s works. The questions, which the pre-Socratic tried to answer, were primarily cosmological questions and they were also concerned with the questions of the theory of knowledge. He stated that: “It is my belief that philosophy must return to cosmology and to a simple theory of knowledge. There is at least one philosophical problem in which all thinking men are interested: the problem of understanding the world in which we live; and thus ourselves (who are part of that world) and our knowledge of it. All science is cosmology, I believe, and for me the interest of philosophy, no less than of science, lies solely in its bold attempt to add to our knowledge of the world, and to the theory of our knowledge of the world. . . . For me, both philosophy and science lose all their attraction when they give up that pursuit.”viii
Popper’s philosophy is a comprehensive system of ideas whose progressive unfolding reveals a more general philosophy of life and cosmology. Popper had written on even the most technical matters with consummate clarity, the scope of his work is such that it is commonplace by now to find that commentators tend to deal with the epistemological, scientific and social elements of his thought as if they were quite dissimilar and unconnected, and thus the fundamental unity of his philosophical vision and method has to a large extent been scattered. A general interpretative method has been adopted by Popper throughout his works. For Popper, any serious theory is an attempt to solve a particular theoretical or practical problem and further maintained that any rational analysis should proceed from an investigation of both the natures of the problem and the particular problem situation in which thinkers locate themselves.ix After a specialized start in the philosophy of science, Popper revealed himself as a philosopher of wide reach, making contributions across the spectrum from pre-Socratic studies to modern logic, from politics to probability, and from the mind-body problem to the interpretation of quantum theory. He is one of the most discussed philosophers of the last century with all his books in print, which were translated into many languages. His ideas were systematically misunderstood and misrepresented which led him to spend uncommon energy to issues of interpretation and commentary on his own work.
Demarcation between science and non-science
The two prominent problems that structure in Popper’s theory of science is the ‘problem of induction’ and ‘problem of demarcation’. The problem of induction can be stated as what relation that holds between theoretical knowledge and experience. The problem of demarcation can be stated as what distinguishes science from metaphysics as well as from logic and mathematics. His solution to these two problems are set out and shown to converge. That is, knowledge results when statements are accepted describing experience that contradict and hence refute the hypothesis. Thus, a deductive rather than an inductive relation holds between theoretical knowledge and experience. Experience teaches us by correcting the errors. Only hypotheses falsifiable by experience should count as scientific. Popper was primarily concerned with the specific problem of demarcation, but also extended his solutions to the philosophical problems of epistemology, which should be identified with the theory of scientific method. According to Popper, the growth of knowledge can be best studied by studying the growth of scientific knowledge. He was determined to establish the rules or norms, by which the scientist is guided when engaged in research or in discovery. Ascertaining the growth of scientific knowledge must be formulated in terms of logic. Thus, Popper’s project was normative and prescriptive rather than empirical and descriptive. By applying rationality in science, he aimed to provide a logic of scientific discovery, a logical analysis of the procedure through which the scientist constructs hypotheses, or systems of theories, and tests them against experience by observation and experiment.x
The demarcation between science and non-science lies in the manner in which scientific theories make testable predictions and are given up when they fail their tests. Popper in the Logic of Scientific Discovery, attacked psychologism, naturalism, inductionism and logical positivism and replaced them by a set of methodological rules called ‘Falsifiability’. Falsifiability is the idea that science progresses by unjustified, exaggerated guesses followed by unstinting criticism. Those hypotheses which are capable of clashing with observation reports are only allowed to be counted as scientific. For example: -‘Gold is soluble in hydrochloric acid’ is scientific (though false), and,’ some homeopathic medicine does work’ is taken on its own, unscientific (though possibly true). The example stated first is scientific because it can be eliminated if it is false and the example stated second is unscientific because even if it were false, it cannot be got rid of by confronting it with an observation report that contradicted it. Therefore, unfalsifiable theories are like the computer programmes with no uninstall option that just clog up the computers precious storage space. On the other hand, falsifiable theories enhance the control over error while expanding the richness of what can be said about the world. Any positive support for theories is both unattainable and superfluous. All that can be done is to create theories and eliminate the errors, even though hypothetical, it may be successful. Thus Popper proposed an alternative scientific method based on falsifiability. Though there may be many confirming instances for a theory, it only takes one counter observation to falsify it. That is, only one black swan is needed to repudiate the theory that all swans are white.
A scientific hypothesis must provide a logical possibility to be refuted by probable true observation statements. Hence, falsifiability is a required characteristic for a scientific theory according to Popper. Science evolves by shedding its falsified theories. Thus, his approach, falsifiability is similar to the notion of ‘natural selection’. According to this approach the best theory survives. There are two essential qualities, which are the virtues of a good scientific theory. A good theory that is, useful and not necessarily true is a great challenger, which is intrinsically open to all kinds of examination. The broader the range of the claim, the better will be the theory, since wide-ranging claims are highly falsifiable. Further, the life span of the theory against the attack of falsifiability is not relevant for determining its quality. The second essential quality is that, a good scientific theory should be clear and precise. It does not hide behind vague expressions, nor does it act as a double-dealer. The lesser a theory shows this quality, the lesser information will it provide. Thus, falsifiability encourages all kinds of speculative theories, as long as they are stated clearly and precisely. Thereby, the inadequate or the unfitting ones will be put away by further examinations. According to Popper, a scientific theory can never be said to be true but it can be said that it is closer to the truth than its predecessors. Thus, confirmation is not considered as a valid method, i.e., any observational statement either singular or general cannot be true, but may be better than the previous ones. Thereby, the general or singular ‘laws’ are not acceptable to the falsificationists. Popper, thus, came to the conclusion that unless a theory can be proven wrong, it cannot be labeled as scientific. Moreover, risky predictions should be made and be testable. Also, confirming evidence should not count unless it is an attempt to falsify the theory.
Falsifiability as a scientific method
Falsifiability, thus, adopts the logical principle of modus tollens which is the core of Popper’s epistemology and methodology. To verify universal statements on the basis of past singular statement is impossible. But the deductive inference of modus tollens allows universal statements to be refuted by the acceptance of a basic or singular statement. Thus, there is an essential asymmetry between verifiability and falsifiability.xi Popper’s epistemology, similar to that of the logical positivists, adopts the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. That is, between the rules of logic that are true by definition and independent of matters of fact and the statements whose truths are grounded in fact. So far the falsifiability of a statement to be possible, it can be rejected if its empirical or synthetic claims are shown to be false. The rules of deductive logic are held to be unassailable according to Popper’s epistemology.xii
Popper uses modus tollens as the central method of disconfirming , or falsifying, scientific hypothesis. Scientists start with a current scientific theory and use the usual methods of deductive reasoning to derive specific conclusion, of which some are ‘predictions’. Strictly deductive reasoning is ‘truth preserving’, that is, such that if one starts out with ‘true’ premises, one can only deduce ‘true’ conclusions.xiii Almost everyone is familiar with the classical method of reasoning known as modus ponens. The well-known example goes as follows :


If Socrates is a man then Socrates is mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.


The progress of science no longer depends primarily upon this method, but on the less familiar form of modus tollens which goes like this:


If Socrates is a God, then Socrates is immortal.
Socrates is not immortal.
Therefore, Socrates is not a God.
Starting with a ‘theory’ and deducing ‘predictions’ can be stated in the form of a premise, that is, if the theory is true, then the prediction is true. Popper shows that a theory is true cannot be proven, but certainly shows that a prediction is false. If the scientists tests one of these predictions and finds out that it is not true, the modus tollens is used to conclude that the theory cannot be true.


If the theory is true then the prediction is true.
The prediction is not true.
Therefore, the theory is not true.
Thus, science advances when a theory is shown to be false and a new theory is put forward which better explains the phenomena. According to Popper the scientist should attempt to disprove the theory rather than attempting to continually prove it. He thinks that science can help to progressively approach the truth, but can never be certain that the final explanation has been attained. Popper lists out four criteria, or levels of evaluating, for determining whether a proposed theory is sufficient enough to be admitted as a scientific theory. These four steps show how the deductive procedure works, i.e., the testing of a theory is carried out along four different lines.
“First there is the logical comparison of the conclusions among themselves, by which the internal consistency of the system is tested.”xiv This step is the testing of the internal consistency of the theoretical system to see if it involves any contradictions. A set of statements to be admitted as a theory is that it must be internally consistent from a formal, logical point of view. In order to meet these criteria the following conditions must be satisfied. The set of ‘axiom’ statements must be independent and not contradict one another. Also, there must be no dependent statements which contradict other dependent statements. Another condition is that none of these ‘axiom’ statements may have a ‘built in’ contradiction (self contradictory). When a theory satisfies these conditions, all of the ‘basic statements’ of the theory can be deduced, in the strictly logical sense, from the ‘axiom’ statements. This criterion is necessary to permit ‘falsification’ to extend to higher level theories. By insuring that this criterion is met, it is guaranteed that - if a higher level statement is true, then an immediately lower level, dependent statement is true. (This can be called ‘Promise 1’). It can be shown what this means by two steps of modus tollens. Suppose a simple theory with one axiom is there, one ‘middle level’ statement which for this example can be called the ‘hypothesis’ and the only one basic statement, the prediction. Since premise 1 is true for this theory and hence the relationships among the statements of the theory can be shown.


P1. If the axiom is true then the hypothesis is true.
P2. If the hypothesis is true then the prediction is true.
Suppose the prediction turns out false. Then it can be said that :
P3. The prediction is not true.
Argument 1 :
If the hypothesis is true then the prediction is true (P2)
The prediction is not true. (P3)
Therefore, the hypothesis is not true. (Modus tollens)
Argument 2 :
If the axiom is true then the hypothesis is true.(P1)
The hypothesis is not true (from argument 1)
Therefore, the axiom is not true. (Modus tollens)
As this first criterion was satisfied in this simple theory, a false prediction ‘ carried through’ to prove the axiom of the theory false. If these first criteria had not been satisfied, this technique of using modus tollens could not have been used and it cannot be known how a false prediction affected the theory as a whole. In more complex theories, a false prediction might show only that a combination of axioms is inconsistent in regard to their consequences, but not which of the axioms is the one which caused the trouble. Because of this, a false prediction may cause the whole theory to be falsified, or only a part of it.
The modern view of science is that scientific theories are essentially hypothetical or conjectural, and can never be sure that even the best established theory may not be overthrown and replaced by a better approximation, which is the result of Einsteinian revolution. The change of authoritarian theory of scientific knowledge to an anti-authoritarian and critical theory is quite recent. This implies the view that the method of science is essentially the method of critical discussion, and of a critical examination of competing conjectures or hypotheses. Science can be tentatively stated that it begins with theories, prejudices, superstitions and myths. Or rather it begins when a myth is challenged and broken down, when some of the expectations are disappointed. Thus, science begins with problems, practical problems or theoretical problems. When one is faced with a problem there are two kinds of attempts to proceed. The first one is to guess or to conjecture a solution to the problem. A second attempt is to criticize the usually somewhat feeble solutions. Sometimes a guess or a conjecture may withstand the criticism and the experimental tests for quite sometime. But as a rule, it can be found that the conjectures can be refuted, or that they do not solve the problem, or that they solve it only in part. It can be found that even the best solutions, which are able to resist the most severe criticism of the most brilliant and ingenious minds, soon give rise to new difficulties, to new problems. Thus, knowledge grows by proceeding from old problems to new problems by means of conjectures and refutations, i.e., by the refutation of the theories or, more generally, of the expectations. Hence, the method of science is that which systematizes the pre-scientific method of learning from mistakes. It does so by the device called critical discussion. Thus his whole view of scientific method can be summed up by the following three steps:
“1 We stumble over some problem.
2 We try to solve it, for example by proposing some theory.
3 We learn from our mistakes, especially from those brought home to
us by the critical discussion of our tentative solution- a discussion,
which tends to lead to a new problem.
Or in three words: problems – theories - criticism.”xv Popper believed that in these three words the whole procedure of science may be summed up.
Evolutionary epistemology
Popper revived an approach to knowledge called evolutionary epistemology. Evolutionary epistemology applies Darwin’s principle of natural selection to scientific theories and to other forms of knowledge.xvi It is concerned with problem-solving and error elimination under various forms of selective pressure. Actually this contrasts with most theories of knowledge that are concerned with the foundations of belief or the probability of theories. According to Popper, knowledge grows by trial and error, furthermore, by conjectures and refutations. He accepted this theory to explain all forms of learning and problem solving, which also includes the evolution of life on earth. It was the view of Popper that every organism, from the amoeba to Einstein, is constantly engaged in problem solving.xvii That is, in the plant and animal world this involves the production of new reactions, new organs, new forms of life. And in human beings, it involves the production of new ideas. When these forms of life or theories appear they confront selective pressures. They may arise from the biological environment or from competing forms of life. Thereby, ideas meet the competition of alternative theories, critical arguments and experimental tests.
Popper’s evolutionary epistemology is the four step problem-solving schema, that is, the starting point is a problem (P1), which evokes tentative solutions (TS). These are then subjected to the process of error elimination (EE) by way of critical discussion and experimental testing. In the course of these activities new problems emerge (P2).xviii This schema can be initially used to correct many false views about science that promote over specialization and antagonism between science and humanities. Popper’s theory harmonizes the relationship between the various elements of the scientist’s situation. These elements include traditional beliefs, criticism, logic, imagination and experimental trials. Moreover, these elements play complementary roles and so there is no need for the tension and antagonisms that flow from partial and narrow views of problem-solving and creativity, whether in science, art, technology or daily life. The schema brings out the importance of identifying the problems and working on them. In this schema a problem functions as an ecological niche to be colonized by tentative solutions. Problems are not a nuisance because they provide a habitat for new species of ideas, which provides a theory of discovery, based on the creative function of criticism. Though criticism is considered as a negative approach, it is necessary to grasp the full potential of evolutionary epistemology, that is, to understand the creative function of criticism. Thus, problems are the habitat where new ideas grow and criticism has two programmes, that is, to eliminate error and also to generate new problems, that is new habitats. Thereby, Popper’s theory brings out both error elimination and the creative function of criticism. This process must be repeated. Popper puts forward a further function which reveals the protective devices and the conservative limits on criticism that are imposed by many theories of science.
For Popper, the most important characteristic of science is that of error-elimination through criticism. Objectivity of science and rationality of science are merely aspects of the critical discussion of scientific theories. Scientific objectivity is therefore nothing else than the fact that no scientific theory is accepted as dogma, and that all theories are tentative and are open all the time to severe criticism, to a rational critical discussion aiming at the elimination of errors. The result of a scientific discussion is very often inconclusive, i.e., it is not possible to conclusively verify (or even falsify) any of the theories under discussion and also cannot say that one of the theories has definite advantage over its competitors. There must be a certain amount of luck to reach a conclusion that one of the theories has more merit and lesser demerits than the others. For some people say that the theory is accepted in this case, only for the time being. Thereby, the critical discussion justifies the claim that the theory in question is the best available, or in other words, that it comes nearer to the truth.
Human beings like other animals are always involved in problem solving. Human beings have various in-built expectations and mechanisms by which the world and the surroundings are interpreted. But the expectations and the interpretative mechanisms are fallible. Thus, Popper stresses the need to learn from trial and error. However, it is possible for man, unlike animals, using the descriptive and argumentative functions of language to construct a world of culture, outside of himself, in which he is able to externalize and thus to criticize his knowledge. Basing on this, Popper maintained that men differ from animals, for, it is possible for men to let the theories die in the stead. The new approach from the standpoint of biology is not incremental, i.e., it unifies Popper’s whole philosophy. The way in which Popper’s philosophy of biology contributes to the integration of thought can be seen in the new expression of the main problem of epistemology. According to Popper, the main task of the theory of knowledge is to understand it as continuous with animal knowledge, and to understand also its discontinuity, if any, from animal knowledge. Moreover, Popper stated that the origin and the evolution of knowledge might be said to coincide with the origin and evolution of life, and to be closely linked with the origin and evolution of the planet earth. Evolution theory links knowledge, and with it human beings, with the cosmos, and so the problem of knowledge becomes a problem of cosmology. As Popper earlier compared the content of competing theories and assessed their verisimilitude, later he examined the whole realm of cognitive structures found in the animal kingdom, and compared the ‘fit’ between the organic system and its environment. Thus, Popper significantly generalizes the earlier approach, i.e., experience is theory-impregnated and structure-impregnated. Thus, the direct outcome of Popper’s philosophy of biology is a theory of knowledge called evolutionary epistemology. It is the outcome of Popper’s understanding and analysis of the process by which knowledge, be it human or animal grows. Regarding this view, the term ‘knowledge’ alludes to the objective end products of certain evolutionary processes, ranging from the emergence of organs such as the eyes, to the most sophisticated scientific theories which man has propounded.
Critical rationalist method applied in various fields
Popper’s ideas have influenced theorists working in many areas, ranging from economics to art theory. Many scientists and philosophers consider that the writings of Popper are very much needed to protect the objectivity and rationality of science. Thus, he occupies a most influential place in the contemporary society of philosophers and scientists. Popper is not concerned with providing scientists with a rule book for solving their problems. Eventhough modern methodologies or logic of discovery consist of a set of rules for the appraisal of ready, articulated theories, they also serve as theories of scientific rationality and attempt to provide explanations for the growth of objective scientific knowledge.
Actually there are unlimited options in the philosophical tradition of critical rationalism. As critical rationalism often emphasizes criticism, thus it also encourages new approaches and creative thinking. What is needed is to come up with as many new ideas as possible and also let the process of criticism weed out the less workable ones. For critical rationalism accepts that truth is out there and everybody should work for achieving it. Thus, it actually is a very optimistic philosophical tradition. According to critical rationalism, truth is out there and no one has monopoly over it. But what is needed is to work together to try and get a little closer, to it. Thus critical rationalism is a practical guide to knowledge and action. It offers guidance in acquiring new information, in assessing the validity of information offered by others and in taking action to solve problems using the information that is at hand. The critical rationalist does not offer a solution to everything or an infallible guide to all the problems of life. According to the critical rationalists, one has to work within the limits of ones own knowledge, knowing that one can never have the whole truth and can never be certain about the consequences of ones own actions. It is because science and technology work within these limitations that they have become the most successful of all knowledge-driven human activities.
Richard.P.Feynman in Quantum electrodynamics
It can be found that many thinkers in various fields have also adopted the method similar to the one put forward by Popper in their respective fields. Richard. P.Feynman was one of the last century’s most brilliant theoretical physicists and an original thinker. He basically rebuilt the theory of quantum electrodynamics and for this work was awarded Nobel Prize in 1965. According to Feynman, “If we have definite theory, a real guess, from which we can conveniently compute consequences which can be compared with experiment, then in principle we can get rid of any theory. There is always the possibility of proving any definite theory wrong; but notice that we can never prove it right. Suppose that you invent a good guess, calculate the consequences, and discover every time that the consequences you have calculated agree with experiment. The theory is then right? No, it is simply not proved wrong. In the future you could compute a wider range of consequences, there could be a wider range of experiments, and you might then discover that the thing is wrong.”xix Feynman draws out the themes common to the law of gravitation and the great unfolding discoveries of Newton, Maxwell and Einstein.
Morphological Method
Another similar approach is the morphological approach which is a method of solving problems and inventing things devised by Dr. Fritz Zwicky, Professor of Astrophysics at the California Institute of Technology and one time Director of research at the Aerojet Engineering Corporation. The morphological method constitutes the following steps: (1) the problem is defined precisely; (2) a list is made of the basic components or factors involved in the problem (elements); (3) for each element a subsidiary list is made of every form, character or dimension that it could assume (attributes); (4) the elements and their attributes are tabulated in what Zwicky calls a morphological box or multidimensional matrix; and (5) the elements being basic to the problem, are fixed, but the attributes being alternatives, are not. All possible combinations of the attributes are synthesized and then each is thoroughly scrutinized and appraised as a possible solution to the problem. Even illogical combinations are considered, as they may trigger feasible alternatives. Thus, for Zwicky the morphological approach has extraordinary suggestive power and has been used with great success over twenty five years in a wide range of technological, scientific and social spheres. To Zwicky, the recipe for problem solving has two main virtues, i.e., its comparatively exhaustive nature reduces the risk of novel significant combinations being overlooked, and since the synthesis of possible solutions is done systematically and objectively, the blocking effect of conventional thinking and prejudice are avoided.xx
Open model computer programming
Another similar approach can be found in open model computer programming. Open model and the closed model can be distinguished. The most world widely known open model is the Linux operating system. Linux’s real innovation was not technical but social, it was the new, completely open social manner in which it was developed. The closed model is a model in which one person or a very small group of people plans everything in advance and then realizes the plan under its own power. Development occurs behind closed doors and everybody can see only the finished result. On the otherhand in the open model, ideation is open to everyone and ideas are disseminated widely in an early stage, they can still benefit from external additions and criticisms by others, whereas when a closed model is presented in its finished form, its foundations can no longer be changed. Here people try out different approaches and then when some one has a brilliant idea, the others adopt it and build upon it. This open source model is as follows: it all begins with a problem or goal that some one finds personally significant. That person may release just the problem or goal itself, but usually a solution will also be provided. In the open model, a recipient has the right to freely use test, and develop this solution. This is possible only if the information that has led to the solution (the source) has been passed on with it. Another possible allegory for the open source model is the academy. Scientists release their work openly to others for their use, testing and further development. Their research is based on the idea of an open and self-correcting process. The scientific ethic entails a model in which theories are developed collectively and their flaws are perceived and gradually removed by means of criticism provided by the entire scientific community.xxi
Post-modern Technoscience
A similarity between Popper’s ideas and Post–modern Technoscience can also be found. Technoscience is the term used by Jean Francoise Lyotard and Stephen Toulmin to describe the inter-relation and mutual dependence of science and technology. Postmodernism can be characterized as consisting the following three steps. Initially, it denies any privileging whatsoever, so that any claim or principle or idea or theory is on par with any other claim. It does not matter their origins and current credibility, but they ought to have their day in the intellectual courts. Secondly, it insists on the fluidity of adherence to tradition; so that pre-modern, modern, a-modern and post-modern methods of inquiry should all be consulted and incorporated into the knowledge framework on which decisions are based.xxii This means, for example, that romantic ideas are not contrasted with those of the enlightenment rationalists but are inter woven with them. Finally it refuses to reduce all ideas and observations, all claims and theories, to one set of foundations, one set of principles. Thus, the postmodernists insist on contextualizing judgements to particular frameworks and settings so that the appropriateness of the criteria by which something is judged will also be examined. There are many variations of postmodernism. Popper exhibits postmodernist tendencies in every chapter of every book he has written. In a more profound sense, to be postmodern in relation to anything scientific is to be a critical rationalist in the Popperian tradition. Thus, the postmodernists like Lyotard have an affinity with Popper and his ideas to the extent that they use rational means to make their points and they all believe in the value of critique.
Gary Kasparov in Chess
Other than the scientific fields, the critical rationalist approach is found in Chess, which is highlighted in Gary Kasprov’s autobiography. Gary Kasparov, who became the youngest Chess World Champion in history, is the most exciting and charismatic personality in this highly compelling sport. He was a pupil of Botvinnik School. Kasporav recalls Botvinnik’s ideas who tried to take the mystery out of chess, always relating it to situations in ordinary life, for whom chess was typical inexact problem similar to those which people try to solve in everyday life. Thus, to solve inexact problem, it is essential to limit the scope of the problem so as not to get entangled in it and only then is there the chance of finding a more exact solution. Therefore it is a mistake to think that chess does not reflect objective reality. Thus, to reduce the problem to a manageable size was Botvinnik’s approach to chess and indeed to life also. It reflects man’s thinking. Kasparov was constantly amazed and convinced at the inexhaustibility and unpredictability of chess. Millions of games have been played and thousands of books about the game have been written, but no chess formula or method, which can guarantee victory, has yet been found. To this day there are no mathematically valid, precise criteria for evaluating even a single move, let alone a position. After just three opening moves by each player, more than nine million different positions are possible.xxiii Kasporav says, “I am not used to avoiding complication, be it on the chessboard or in life . . . nothing is permanent under sun . . . To play creatively without being afraid of risky ventures and to process a refined chess style in no way releases you from the need to work hard. … Chess after all, is not some body of knowledge learned once and for all, chess is dynamic, and any final result may turn out in actual fact to be simply an intermediate one. The truth has to be proved every time. I like to keep updating them: in time, many ideas come to be reassessed, including, of course, ones own ideas. I am eager to go back to my mistakes and analyse them.”xxiv Further, Kasprov does not regard his work as complete and as not subject to review. Any chess commentary or entire book can merit consideration only if it passes the test of time. So the reader is urged to look for further mistakes, the revealing, of which will be an important contribution in the search for chess truth.xxv
Conclusion
To conclude, truth is hard to come by. It needs both ingenuity in criticizing old theories, and ingenuity in the imaginative invention of new theories. This is so not only in the sciences but also in all fields. Serious critical discussions are always difficult. Non-rational human elements such as personal problems always enter. Victory in a debate is nothing, while even the slightest clarification of one’s problem, even the smallest contribution made towards a clearer understanding of one’s own position or that of one’s opponent, is a great success. Rational discussion is a rare thing. It does not aim at conversion, and it is modest in its expectation. It is more than enough to see things in a new light or that to get even a little nearer to the truth. The need for theory is immense and so is the power of theories. It is more important to guard against becoming addicted to any particular theory, not to be caught in a mental prison. For this the essential step is the formulations of beliefs, which become the targets of criticism. Thus the beliefs are replaced by competing theories, by competing conjectures. Thus there will be progress only through the critical discussion of these theories. Scientific approach or a scientific way of life involves a burning interest in objective scientific theories, that is the theories in themselves, and in the problem of their truth, or their nearness to truth. And this interest is a critical interest, an argumentative interest. For the scientists who uncritically accept a ruling dogma it will be the end of science, the end of the tradition created by Thales and Anaximander and further rediscovered by Galileo. So far science to be the search for truth, it will be the rational critical discussion of the revolutionary theory. This process decides whether the new theory is better than the older one whether to be regarded as a step towards the truth or not.
Observations and reports of observation are under the sway of theories. There is no such thing as an uninterpreted observation, an observation which is not theory-impregnated. In fact, the eyes and ears are the result of evolutionary adaptations, that is, the method of trial and error corresponding to the method of conjectures and refutations. Both methods are adjustments to environmental regularities. But to transcend even the genetically based physiology is possible only through the critical method. Thus it is the method of science, the method of critical discussion, which makes it possible to transcend not only the culturally acquired but even the inborn framework. This method transcends not only the senses, but also the partly innate tendency to regard the world as a universe of identifiable things and their properties.
A rational discussion must have the character of a justification or of a proof, or of a demonstration, or of a logical derivation from admitted premises. But the approach of natural sciences might have taught the philosophers that there is also another kind of rational discussion, i.e., the critical discussion which does not seek to prove or to justify or to establish a theory, least of all by deriving it from some higher premises. But this tries to test the theory under discussion by finding out whether its logical consequences are all acceptable, or whether it has, perhaps, some undesirable consequences. It is possible to distinguish logically between a mistaken method of criticizing and a correct method of criticizing. The mistaken method tries to establish or justify the thesis or the theory, which leads to dogmatism or to an infinite regress. Whereas, the correct method of critical discussion tries to find out the consequences of the thesis or the theory and whether they are acceptable. This method will also be conscious of the fallibility of all the methods, although it tries to replace all the theories by better ones.
Critical rationalism is a methodological approach which involves the consideration of the arguments of other people without regarding their status. It also reduces domination by one particular group and thereby aims at equality. It also gives emphasis on trustable statements, experimentation and refutation. Moreover, it is an intellectual activity based on the use of reason and compromise to reach a decision. For this, deduction and the evaluation of consequences are also adopted. This method gives paramount importance to open discussion, freedom of expression and criticism of current and traditional thinking, that is, the realization of the fallibility of knowledge including that of science. It also acknowledges the shortcomings of inductive thinking and how it narrows and restricts the awareness of alternatives. It accepts uniqueness of events in a complex, uncertain world plus an awareness of the inability to be predictive. And finally, it has got faith in the notion of objectivity.
The activity of science is a human activity and no human activity can ever be perfect. Critical rationalism teaches one to be aware of this knowledge and thereby to live with it. It also teaches one to try to do the best possible in these circumstances. In fact, human activity brings about both intended and unintended consequences and the unintended consequences are by their nature unpredictable. Hence there is no inevitable march of progress. For progress, however conceived, one must require the freedom to subject all ideas to rigorous criticism or else the false ones may flourish. Thus, all theories and ideas must be subjected to the most rigorous criticism, trying to falsify the ideas by finding countervailing evidence. One must not also get bogged down in searching for counter example. That is, if the idea is good, one will find plenty of attempts to disprove the idea. The idea also must be creative and adventurous. Until those ideas are subjected to the most rigorous criticism, it does not do any harm to have any wild ideas. One must also be alert to the unforeseen consequences of actions and be prepared to change the ideas which lead to those consequences. Although critical rationalism is not limited to criticism as some philosophers have thought, but what is of importance is the discovery and development of new problems. Thus, critical rationalism is more than mere criticism. Critical rationalism also means a totally new attitude with regard to mistakes. Though mistakes are no longer something one has to hide, but they are to be discovered and discussed, because the discovery of a mistake signals new knowledge.
To sum I am using Popper’s words :
“I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth.”




Endnotes
i  First signs of critical attitude that is the freedom of thought can be found in Anaximander’s criticism of Thales. Thales, the founder of the Ionian school, one of the seven sages was the master and kinsman of Anaximander. Therefore, it should be noted that, it was Thales, who founded the new tradition of freedom, willing to tolerate criticism and thereby a new relation between master and pupil came into being. Thus Thales’ encouragement of criticism from the pupils would explain the fact that the critical attitude towards the master’s doctrine became part of the Ionian school tradition. The Greek tradition of philosophical criticism had its main source in Ionia. Moreover, it meant a break with the dogmatic tradition, which permits only one doctrine, and in its place admits a plurality of doctrines which all try to approach the truth by means of critical discussion.

ii  The character of Greek philosophy and the philosophical schools is different from the dogmatic type of schools. In every generation, a new philosophy, a new cosmology of staggering originality and depth can be found. For them, the story of the problem of change is the story of a critical debate, of a rational discussion. New ideas are propounded as such, and arise as the result of open criticism. There are few, if any, surreptitious changes. Instead of anonymity we find a history of ideas and of their originators.
 The gods did not reveal, from the beginning,
All things to us; but in the course of time,
Through seeking, men find that which is the better.
These things are, we conjecture, like the truth.

But as for certain truth, no man has known it,
Nor will he know it; neither of the gods,
Nor yet all the things of which I speak.
And even if by chance here were to utter.
The final truth, he would himself not know it:
For all is but a woven web of guesses.”
(K. R. Popper, In Search of a Better World: Lectures and Essays from Thirty Years, p. 38.)

iv  “It is not the nature or character of man to possess true knowledge, though it is in the divine nature. . . . He who does not expect the unexpected will not detect it; for him it will remain undetectable, and unapproachable.”
(K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, p. 153.)

v  “But infact, nothing do we know from having seen it; for the truth is hidden in the deep.”
(K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, p. 153.)

vi  D. W. Miller, A Pocket Popper, (Great Britain: Fontana Paper Backs, 1983), p. 29.
 Ibid., p.28.
viii K. R. Popper, Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics, Ed. W. W. Bartley, III (1982; rpt. London: Routledge, 2000), p. 200.

ix Idem.

x K. R. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, 6th rev. ed. (1959; rpt. London: Hutchinoon, 1975), pp. 49-50.

xi  Ibid. , pp. 40-42.
xii G. Stokes, Popper: Philosophy, Politics and Scientific method (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 16.

xiii K. R. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp.41-42.

xiv  K. R. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp. 32-33.
xv K. R. Popper, The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality, Ed. M. A. Notturno (1994; rpt. London: Routledge, 2000), p. 101.

xvi  K. R. Popper, Objective knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972.
p.145
xvii  Idem.
xviii  K.R.Popper, Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem: In Defence of Interaction, Ed.M.A.Notturno (1994;rpt.,London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 10-11.
xix Richard. P. Feynman., The Character of Physical law (1965; rpt. London: Penguin Books, 1992), pp. 157-58.

xx W. I. B. Beveridge, Seeds of Discovery (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980), pp. 12-13.

xxi Pekka Himanen, The Hacker Ethic : And The Spirit Of The Information Age (London: Vintage, 2001), pp. 66-68.

xxii John Docker, Postmodernism And Popular Culture: A Cultural History (1994; rpt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 111-113.

xxiii Gary Kasparov and Donald Trelford, Unlimited Challenge: The Autobiography of Gary Kasparov, rev. ed. (1987; rpt. Great Britain: Fontana Paper backs, 1990), pp. 19-20.

xxiv  Ibid. , p. 34.
xxv Gary Kasparov, The Test of Time, trans. K. P. Neat (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1986), n p.

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